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The 1980s have seen a dramatic increase in global foreign direct investment 
(FDI)  within the Center on Transnational Corporations triad (UN  1991). In 
particular, both Japanese and European firms have rapidly increased their hold- 
ings in the United States, while U.S. and Japanese investments in Western Eu- 
rope have expanded considerably. Foreign direct investment into Japan, how- 
ever, remains the weakest link, with flows much smaller than those into the 
United States and Europe, even when the relatively smaller size of the Japanese 
economy is accounted for (Transnational Corporations  and Management Divi- 
sion 1992, 20, table 1.4). The result is that foreign firms play  an unusually 
small role in the Japanese economy. As noted by  Edward Graham and Paul 
Krugman (1991,33), compared with other major economies such as Germany, 
France and the United States, in which between 14 percent and 26 percent of 
industrial assets are controlled by foreigners, the 1 percent share controlled by 
foreigners in Japan is minuscule. Other data indicate a similarly low share of 
FDI in Japanese employment, sales, and domestic capital formation. 
Should one be surprised at these low levels of FDI in Japan? What do they 
tell us about the nature of the Japanese market? The official Japanese interpre- 
tation is that foreigners can readily succeed in Japan, although it takes consid- 
erable effort. Indeed, publications of government agencies (e.g., JETRO 1989) 
proclaim the success of  firms such as IBM, Texas Instruments, Procter and 
Gamble, and Coca-Cola. According to the Japan Economic Journal (1990, l), 
“As numerous examples of successful foreign ventures testify, [Japan] may not 
be an easy market, but it certainly is an open one.” 
The author is grateful to Dara Menashi for her contributions and her superb research assistance 
and for comments and assistance from Richard Marston, Mark Mason, Karl  P.  Sauvant, Louis 
Wells, and participants in presentations at  the National Bureau of Economic Research and the 
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University. In addition he thanks Dan Crisa- 
fulli, Paula Holmes, and John Park for their assistance. 
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But the success stones seem to be the exception rather than the rule. The 
relatively low FDI stock in Japan is partly the result of  a history of  official 
inhibitions on FDI. As Dennis Encarnation (1992) and Mark Mason (1992) 
describe, inward FDI was heavily restricted for much of the postwar period. 
Officially, however, at least since the early 1980s, the Japanese market has been 
open to FDI.’ Indeed, JETRO (1989, 1) disseminates reports by the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Japan and by  the European Business Community 
which state that “government regulations are no longer an obstacle to foreign 
investment in Japan.”2 
4.1  Recent Foreign Direct Investment in Japan 
One might have expected that FDI would surge in the 1980s as firms com- 
pensated for their previous exclusion from Japan. According to Japan’s Minis- 
try of Finance, which records notifications rather than actual transactions, the 
pace of inward FDI has accelerated. The Japan Economic Institute (1991a, 3) 
reports that between  1980 and 1990 the Ministry of Finance was notified of 
$12.6 billion as additions to equity capital. This raised the total of postwar FDI 
from 8,826 cases valued at $3 billion at the end of  1980 to 42,900 cases valued 
at $15.5 billion at the end of 1990. 
Ministry of Finance data, however, overstate FDI since they refer to notifi- 
cations and not to actual investments and do not include loan repayments or 
liquidations of assets. In fact, in recent years, major withdrawals, particularly 
from minority-owned ventures, have been significant. These include the much 
publicized sales of equity by General Motors, Chrysler, Honeywell, Avon, and 
Southland Corporation (7-Eleven). According to estimates made by the United 
States Department of Commerce using balance-of-payments data reported by 
the Bank of Japan, the value of the total stock of inward FDI (valued at histori- 
cal cost) in Japan at the end of  1989 was a mere $9.2 billion (to be sure, a 
threefold increase over the value in 1980), an amount that implied no increase 
in the global share of inward FDI of Japan over the de~ade.~ 
The estimates of the Bank of  Japan understate FDI in Japan because they 
exclude reinvested earnings. An indication of the importance of this omission 
1. In 1980, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law allowed FDI in all but four 
industries (petroleum, leather, mining, and agriculture). Notification of investments was still re- 
quired, and the government retained the right to object to any investment deemed a threat to na- 
tional security or to “the smooth performance of the Japanese economy.” Japan also retained the 
right to reject investments “from the viewpoint of reciprocity.” Nonetheless, in principle, such 
objections were supposed to be rare. In  1992, the diet enacted provisions to remove the gov- 
ernment’s authority to block FDI deemed a threat to the smooth performance of the economy 
(Mason, forthcoming). 
2. The U.S. government argued in the Structural Impediments Initiative talks that the notifica- 
tion process involved delays. In 1991, the Japanese diet shifted to ex post facto reports; in March 
1992, the government of Japan actually passed a law designed to encourage FDI. 
3. It is striking that just two acquisitions, one of MCA Inc. by  Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co. Ltd. in late 1990 ($6 billion) and the other of Columbia Pictures by Sony Corporation ($3.4 
billion), are roughly equal to the entire value of the stock of inward FDI in Japan. 87  Japan’s Low Levels of  Inward Investment 
can be gleaned from the data reported by the United States, which is the largest 
foreign investor in Japan. (On a cumulative basis, Minister of  Finance data 
suggest that, as of  March  1991, United States investors held 47 percent of 
the total book value of reported FDI.) U.S. balance-of-payments data show a 
significant increase in the value of  the FDI position of  the United States in 
Japan, valued at historical cost. Between  1982 and  1990, for example, this 
position tripled, from $6.4 billion to $21 billion. This represents a considerably 
faster rise than the twofold increase in the global stock of U.S. FDI valued at 
historical cost over the same period. However, the data also reveal that the 
growth was dominated by the activities of enterprises that were already in Ja- 
pan. Valuation adjustments (which occur, for example, when a U.S. affiliate is 
sold to another U.S. owner), reinvested earnings, and intercompany debt flows 
more than account for the growth. On balance, changes in equity capital were 
actually negative. Apparently, liquidations outweighed new injections of capi- 
tal.4  In sum, therefore, it appears that the foreign stake in Japan is growing, but 
primarily through the reinvested earnings of the firms already resident in Japan. 
New  inflows have been offset by  increased exit. As a result, compared with 
that of other economies, the overall FDI stock in Japan remains unusually low. 
In  1990, assets held by U.S. foreign affiliates in Japan accounted for 12.8 per- 
cent of the total assets held by all U.S. foreign affiliates abroad. However, these 
data include U.S. minority stakes in firms such as Mazda, Mitsubishi Motors, 
and Isuzu. Japan accounted for only 5.7 percent of the assets in United States 
majority-owned  foreign  affiliates worldwide  and  only  5.5 percent  of  the 
majority-owned manufacturing affiliates. 
This paper argues that the difficulties of acquiring existing Japanese firms 
help explain the low level of FDI in Japan. Indeed, the distribution system and 
other unusual entry barriers to the Japanese market suggest that the demand 
for acquisitions by foreigners contemplating FDI should be unusually high. In 
fact, however, most foreign entry into Japan occurs through greenfield opera- 
tions. Obstacles to acquisition on the supply side, therefore, dominate entry 
patterns. The low levels of FDI in Japan reflect the need to rely on greenfield 
entry in a market in which entry barriers would normally induce entry through 
acquisition. One of the major barriers to foreign acquisitions of Japanese firms 
are the stock cross-holdings of  Japanese corporate groups. Statistically sig- 
nificant evidence suggests, indeed, that keiretsu linkages inhibit FDI in Japan. 
The final section of the paper considers some implications of this finding. 
4.2  The Demand for Acquisitions 
Foreign firms may face higher market entry costs than their domestic coun- 
terparts. Some of these simply reflect a lack of familiarity with the domestic 
4. New inflows of equity capital were not a major source of  the overall growth of the United 
States FDI position worldwide. Between  1982 and 1990, only 4 percent of the growth in the 
historical-cost position reflects net equity flows. 88  Robert Z. Lawrence 
economy; others may be permanent and reflect official and/or private discrimi- 
nation against foreign-owned firms. Much of FDI theory rests on the recogni- 
tion of these disadvantages and the insight that, to compete abroad, a firm must 
have compensating advantages in the form of specialized product, process, or 
marketing assets. But establishing a majority-owned foreign operation is not 
necessarily the optimal means of exploiting firm-specific assets. One alterna- 
tive is to service the foreign market through exports. If foreign production is 
advantageous (e.g., because of  trade barriers, transportation or production 
costs, or the benefits of  market proximity), then licensing, franchising, and 
joint  ventures could be  attractive alternatives to  majority-owned FDI.  Of 
course, these methods of market entry could be complementary. However, it is 
instructive to consider the factors that determine choices between them, since 
it helps to evaluate the characteristics of FDI in Japan. 
4.2.1 
Consider first the choice between FDI and licensing without equity. Licens- 
ing has the advantage of saving the firm the costs of manufacture and market 
entry. On the other hand, licensing requires formulating and monitoring a con- 
tract relating to the foreign use of the specific assets of the licensing firm. As 
Edward John Ray (1989,59) points out, the licenser faces risks of opportunistic 
behavior by  the licensee and difficulties of  assessing the value of  the assets 
being licensed. In  addition, where specific assets of  a firm are not easily re- 
duced to a formula or a blueprint, the licensee faces the risk that the know- 
how will not be readily assimilated. Foreign direct investment, by  contrast, 
allows a firm to internalize these contracting, informational, and transference 
difficulties, although it requires incurring the costs associated with foreign en- 
try and operation. As Ray notes, the desire to invest directly is positively re- 
lated to these licensing contract costs and negatively related to the market entry 
and operating costs of the investing firm. A reliance on licensing suggests the 
dominance of entry and marketing costs over contracting costs. 
The propensity to license could also rise with the presence of domestic mo- 
nopolie~.~  Foreign firms could prefer to take advantage of domestic monopoly 
power of a local firm rather than enter into head-to-head competition with it. 
Indeed, a domestic firm with existing market power may be prepared to pay 
more for a license than would firms that are forced to compete. 
The government of Japan has historically induced foreign firms to grant li- 
censes by placing severe restrictions on FDI. Officially, the Ministry of Interna- 
tional Trade and Industry (MITI) is no longer engaged in such activities. None- 
theless, it is clear that, compared with other nations, a disproportionate  amount 
of United States know-how continues to be exploited in Japan through licens- 
ing rather than through export sales or FDI. In  1990, for example, the $1.2 
billion U.S. companies earned from royalties and licensed fees from Japan 
Foreign Direct Investment versus Licensing 
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accounted for 35 percent of U.S. receipts from royalties and fees from unaffil- 
iated foreigners worldwide.6 By contrast, in  1990, U.S. receipts from Japan 
from foreign affiliates in the form of  income and royalties and license fees 
were only 5.5 percent of total U.S. receipts from affiliates worldwide. Indeed, 
U.S. earnings from royalties and license fees from unaffiliated Japanese firms 
were 33 percent of all U.S. receipts from their foreign affiliates in Japan in the 
form of income and royalty fees. By contrast, worldwide, total U.S. receipts 
from payments of royalties and fees by unaffiliated foreigners amounted to just 
5.2 percent of total U.S. receipts (income plus royalties) from affiliates. 
Over the 1980s, as restrictions on FDI were removed, the role of licensing 
might have been expected to diminish. Yet, in  1980, the $354 million paid by 
unaffiliated Japanese firms to the United States in the form of fees and royalties 
equaled 40 percent of FDI income-considerably  smaller than the correspond- 
ing ratio of 61 percent in 1990. In  1980, Japan accounted for 30 percent of all 
U.S. income from fees and royalties; in 1990, its share was 35 percent. To be 
sure, more research is required to determine how  much of the rapid growth 
in Japanese fees and royalties reflects recent licensing and how much simply 
reflects a historical legacy. 
4.2.2  Joint Ventures 
Consider next the choice between minority positions in joint ventures and 
majority-owned FDI. Joint ventures represent a compromise between licensing 
and full control. They may be more advantageous to foreign firms than licens- 
ing is, because they permit a foreign firm to exploit its specific assets while 
economizing on the costs of  operation in a foreign environment and avoiding 
some of the contract costs associated with licensing; they may be more advan- 
tageous to the domestic firm in ensuring an effective transfer of the specific 
foreign assets. Joint ventures, nonetheless, retain the risks associated with the 
loss of know-how to foreign partners and with the lack of complete operating 
control. Both partners in joint ventures may fear the creation of  formidable 
future competitors. In general, one would expect joint ventures to predominate 
over FDI in those cases in which operating in a foreign environment presented 
unusually large problems for foreign-owned firms, because of  entry barriers 
and/or operating difficulties (e.g., nationalistic discrimination against foreign- 
owned firms). Indeed, often sanctioned by law, joint ventures predominate in 
FDI in developing countries following protectionist policies. Joint ventures 
could also be a means of collusion when ventures have monopoly potential. 
Generally, however, U.S. firms prefer to invest abroad in majority-owned 
ventures. In 1990, majority-owned companies accounted for about 78 percent 
of the FDI assets of U.S. firms. By contrast, only 34 percent of the FDI assets 
in Japan and only 26 percent of the assets in manufacturing were in majority- 
6. In  1990, Japanese firms earned only $185 million in payments from unaffiliated U.S. firms 
for royalties and license fees. This is less than one-sixth of  the corresponding receipts from un- 
affiliated  Japanese firms earned by U.S. firms. 90  Robert Z. Lawrence 
owned companies. Indeed, there is a relationship between countries that have 
generally discriminated against FDI and the share of majority-owned firms in 
FDI assets. While in developed countries that ratio averaged 76 percent, the 
conspicuous outliers are the Republic of Korea (1  8 percent), India (14 percent) 
and Japan (34 percent). 
There is evidence, however, that the U.S. FDI position in Japan is becoming 
more concentrated in majority-owned firms. In  1977, for example, majority- 
owned U.S. affiliates accounted for only  16 percent of  the assets of  U.S.- 
affiliated firms in Japan. One source of that shift is the actual decline in the 
activity associated with minority-interest U.S. affiliates in that country. Indeed, 
as reported in table 4.1, employment and sales (adjusted for exchange rates 
and inflation) in minority-interest U.S. affiliates in Japan actually declined by 
28 percent and 36 percent, respectively, between 1977 and 1990. The second 
source of the shift is the rapid growth in real assets (increasing by 91 percent) 
and real employment (increasing by  70 percent) of majority-owned ventures. 
Thus, while the U.S. stake in majority-owned affiliates in Japan remains un- 
usually small, it is a growing component of the overall U.S. FDI position. 
4.2.3  Investment in Wholesale Trade 
As emphasized in particular by Encarnation (1992), U.S. majority-owned 
investment in Japan has been heavily directed toward wholesale trade. Valued 
at historical cost, worldwide U.S. investment in wholesale trade accounted for 
just 11 percent of the U.S. global FDI position in 1990. A similar valuation of 
the U.S. position in Japan indicates that wholesale trade has an  18 percent 
share in the U.S. position. Similarly, the value of  assets in majority-owned 
affiliates involved in wholesale trade account for 18 percent of all assets held 
by  majority-owned U.S. Japanese affiliates. By  contrast, only  10 percent of 
majority-owned affiliate assets worldwide are in wholesale trade. Also, unlike 
other forms of investment in Japan, U.S. FDI in wholesale trade is predomi- 
nantly majority owned. Indeed, in 1990,49 percent of all U.S. assets in whole- 
sale trade were in majority-owned firms. These data strongly suggest either 
unusual profit opportunities in this industry or the importance of  such invest- 
ment for making sales. 
In  sum, the  continued dependence on  licensing, the heavy  reliance on 
minority-interest ventures, and the relatively large investments in majority- 
owned wholesale trade ventures support the argument that the marketing and 
distribution of foreign products in Japan are unusually difficult or that current 
inflows have been too small to offset the impact of earlier policies. (The data 
on U.S. licensing and wholesale trade investment could also indicate a lack 
of competition.) 
A study conducted by  the U.S. International Trade Commission (1990) 
singled out: 
Legal restrictions on retailing, wh~lesaling,  and investment as limiting entry. 
These include a weak enforcement of  the antimonopoly law  of  Japan, the 91  Japan’s Low Levels of Inward Investment 
Table 4.1  U.S. FDI: Japan versus Developed Countries in 1977 and 1990 
Qpe  of Affiliate 
Percentage 
1977  1990  Change 
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Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues; U.S. De- 
partment of Commerce, National Trade Data Bank  U.S.  Department of Commerce (1981). 
Note: In 1977, $1 in U.S. = 268.5 yen. In 1990, $1 U.S. = 144.8 yen. 
*Real saleslassets adjusted for inflation and exchange rate changes. The consumer price index in 
Japan rose by 54 percent during the period 1977-1990. 
Large Retail Store Law (which limits expansion of large retailers), and other 
regulations and entry fees. 
Business practices used by manufacturers to exert vertical control over distri- 
bution channels and to reduce horizontal competition. 
The high costs associated with setting up independent distribution systems 
(land rent, warehousing, transportation), partly as a result of government tax 
and land use policies. 
Social customs that emphasize long-term relations, resulting in less willing- 
ness by purchasers to switch suppliers or retailers. 
4.2.4  Greenfield versus Acquisitions 
Once the decision to invest has been made, a firm has the choice of  either 
starting a greenfield operation or acquiring an existing operation. In equilib- 92  Robert Z. Lawrence 
rium, one would expect to see firms priced at their replacement cost-that  is, 
for Tobin’s q (the ratio of the firm’s market value to its replacement costs) to 
equal unity. However, when q = 1 for domestic entrants, foreigners, if  their 
costs of entry are systematically higher, should be prepared to pay more than 
domestic firms do for existing firms. Indeed, except in cases where the specific 
assets can only be transferred to new ventures, one would expect to see acquisi- 
tion as a more common means of entry in FDI than in domestic investment. 
In general, the foreign preference for acquisitions over greenfield investments 
reflects the disadvantages faced by foreigners in establishing domestic opera- 
tions. The more costly it is for foreigners, as compared with domestic firms, to 
enter new markets, the higher the demand for acquisition over greenfield entry. 
In terms of our theoretical analysis, the evidence on licensing, joint ventures, 
and investment in majority-owned wholesale trade operations is strongly sug- 
gestive of unusual barriers to entry, operation, and marketing in Japan. This 
evidence suggests that, ceteris paribus, foreign demand for acquiring existing 
Japanese firms as a means of entry should be unusually high. Ex post, however, 
the share of entry accounted for by foreign acquisitions also reflects the relative 
supply of acquirable assets to foreigners. This supply is related to the overall 
level of economic development. In addition, however, it reflects the market for 
corporate control in general, as well as official and unofficial discrimination 
against foreigners. Indeed, it will be argued below that all factors limiting the 
supply of acquirable assets have played a role in constraining FDI in Japan. 
4.3  The Supply of Acquirable Assets to Foreigners 
Data gathered by the Japan Economic Institute (1990) show that the number 
of  mergers and acquisitions in Japan is actually quite similar to that in the 
United States, but the typical Japanese deal appears to be smaller (table 4.2). 
However, this finding could simply reflect a bias in the samples; the Japanese 
data, which are based on reports to the Fair Trade Commission, are comprehen- 
sive, while the U.S. data may not be. In both countries, merger and acquisition 
activity has increased rapidly in recent years. Although megadeals appear to 
be more rare in Japan, they are not unknown. In fact, the Mitsui Bank merger 
with Taiyo Bank in 1990 was actually the largest in the world in terms of mar- 
ket capitalization (Holloway 1990,41). 
4.3.1  Hostile Takeovers 
The more striking differences between Japan and the United States, how- 
ever, relate to the feasibility of hostile takeovers and of takeovers involving 
foreign firms. In part, hostile takeovers are rare because the Japanese concept 
of a firm places less emphasis on the role of stockholders and more emphasis 
on the rights of other stakeholders-in  particular, employees and management. 
According to the Japan Economic Institute (1990, 13), the Japanese word for 
“takeover bid” (nutturi) can also mean “hijack.” Moreover, the loyalty felt by 93  Japan’s Low Levels of Inward Investment 
Table 4.2  U.S. and Japanese Merger and Acquisition Activity, 1981-1988 
Year 
Number 
















2,395  1,815 
2,346  919 
2,533  1,722 
2,543  1,886 
3,001  1,920 
3,336  2,083 
2,032  2,299 
2,364 
$  82.6  $  10.1 
53.8  13.3 
73.1  8.9 
122.2  10.4 
179.8  15.0 
173.1  27.2 
163.7  24.0 
27.2 
$  34.49  $  5.58 
22.93  14.50 
28.86  5.14 
48.05  5.52 
59.91  7.80 
51.89  13.06 
80.56  10.42 
11.49 
U.S.7  Japan$ 
113  50 
116  47 
138  63 
200  81 
270  79 
346  112 
301  131 
Sources: Japan Economic Institute (1990). 
*The dollar values of Japanese deals were calculated using current exchange rates from the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund, Zntemational Financial Statistics (various issues); Japanese data are for 
fiscal years. 
?Deal of $100 million-plus. 
$Deals of  V5O billion-plus; V50 billion = $220 million, $210 million, and $346 million in  1980, 
1985, and 1987, respectively. 
employees and management to large firms in a system (often characterized 
by lifetime employment) stands in the way of even friendly mergers in which 
companies lose their identity. 
In part, however, hostile takeovers are more difficult because many Japanese 
firms have large percentages of their stock held either by  stable shareholders 
(such as insurance companies and trust and pension funds), who have close 
relations  with  the  management of  the  company,  or  by  keiretsu  members 
(that is,  members of  a  corporate  group characterized by  extensive cross- 
shareholdings). In many cases, these two groups account for two-thirds of all 
outstanding shares of a company and therefore can prevent hostile takeovers. 
The practice of cross-shareholdings was originally a response to the prohibi- 
tion on holding companies that was implemented in Japan in the early 1950s 
to prevent the reconstitution of the large prewar zaibatsu conglomerates. De- 
spite these strictures, the three former zaibatsu groups-Mitsubishi,  Mitsui 
and  Sumitomo-and  other large groups of  diverse companies (horizontal 
keiretsu) centered on major banks have developed more subtle mechanisms of 
collaboration, a feature of which is extensive cross-holdings of stock. In addi- 
tion, other groups, centered on such large manufacturing companies as Nippon 
Steel and Toyota (vertical keiretsu),  have developed close links that involve an 
exchange of equity. For the six largest horizontal groups, the average percent- 
age of stock of a group held by other group members ranged from 7 percent to 
14.3 percent in 1963 and had risen to between 12.2 percent and 26.9 percent 
in 1988 (fiscal year). 
Nonetheless, hostile takeovers are not  unknown in Japan. For example, 94  Robert Z. Lawrence 
Aaron Viner (1988,89-90)  noted that Takami Takahashi (president of the Mi- 
nebea ball bearing company) has masterminded takeovers in both Japan and 
the United States. Minebea was also the object of a takeover attempt by  for- 
eigners, who acquired stocks through convertible bonds and warrants that are 
traded anonymously in the Euromarket. However, a foreign participant in the 
effort, Charles Knapp (a Los Angeles financier), “could not find a single Japa- 
nese bank or securities house to help in any capacity with his bid” (p. 90), and 
Takahasi successfully fought off the bid by merging his company with another 
and thereby diluting Knapp’s stake. 
Some suggest that possibilities for hostile mergers have increased recently. 
In part, this reflects increased experience of Japanese firms with acquisitions 
abroad. In addition, Japanese courts that formerly frowned upon hostile take- 
overs have modified their stance in recent rulings. In a particularly noteworthy 
case in 1989 (Shuwa versus Chujitsuya), the court found that efforts to dilute 
Shuwa’s shares by an exchange of stocks at low prices between two targets was 
unfair. This was the first time a court declared antitakeover practices unfair. 
In  addition, Japan has  seen a  nascent debate over  shareholders’ rights, 
sparked in part by the ill-fated efforts of T.  Boone Pickens, who tried to claim 
a seat on the board of Koito Manufacturing Company.’ 
4.3.2  Foreign Acquisitions 
Japan’s other striking difference from the United States relates to its treat- 
ment of  foreign investors. As mentioned above, FDI in Japan was severely 
restricted during the 1950s and 1960s (Encamation 1992, chap. 2). By  1973, 
however, Japan was officially complying with the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and  Development  (OECD) Code of  Liberalization of  Capital 
movements. However, although the official policy was that Japan was open, 
less formal policies undermined this commitment. 
Mason (1992,205-7)  described how a revision of the Commercial Code of 
Japan in 1966 made it easier for Japanese firms to issue shares to third parties 
of their choice. He detailed how firms belonging to industrial groups took ad- 
vantage of these regulations over the following decade to insulate themselves 
from foreign companies. In  addition, an amendment of  the Securities Ex- 
change Law in 1971 introduced a system of  notification of takeover bids. In 
1972, as described by Viner (1988,88), the Bendix Corporation made a tender 
offer for some of the equity in the small firm Jidosha Kiki. This created con- 
cerns and prompted a deliberate effort to prevent foreign firms from initiating 
takeovers of domestic companies. To render foreign takeovers virtually impos- 
sible, 
7. According to the Japan Economic Institute (1991b), on 13 June 1991, a study group of the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry urged the ministry to promote mergers and acquisi- 
tions through various regulatory and legal changes. However, the report also called on the ministry 
to provide legal aid to firms facing hostile buyouts. 95  Japan’s Low Levels of Inward Investment 
hundreds of  corporations (with unofficial Ministry of  Finance encourage- 
ment) which were not members of  keiretsu systematically expanded their 
mutual  shareholdings.  Companies  within  keiretsu  increased  mutual 
shareholding to the legal limit. As a direct result. . . the total percentage of 
shares held by corporations rose 12.7 percent in just one year,  1971/2. [In- 
deed] the redistribution was so effective that between 1978-84, the number 
of foreign acquisitions of Japanese companies numbered just 20. Of these 
only two were of  substantial size (BOC takeover of Osaka Gas and Banyu- 
Merck). (Viner 1988, 88) 
In general, foreign firms contemplating Japanese acquisitions do not enjoy 
national treatment. As of  mid- 1989, as noted in “Mergers and acquisitions” 
(1989), takeover bids from foreigners had to be carried out through a domestic 
securities house, which gave the Ministry of  Finance ten days notice of  its 
intentions-“i.e.,  enough time to organize a rescue operation to be mounted 
to keep the target in Japanese hands” (p. 68). If  a foreign firm managed to 
clear that obstacle, it was allowed just twenty to thirty days to complete the 
acquisition. Japanese firms were not subject to these rules. 
Recent data confirm that foreign involvement in merger and acquisition ac- 
tivity within Japan, though increasing, remains rare. According to data col- 
lected by Yamaichi Securities (table 4.3), between 1985 and 1989, foreign pur- 
chases of Japanese firms were in the range of about twenty per year; however, 
these data include purchases outside of  Japan. By contrast, there was a dra- 
matic increase in Japanese purchases of foreign firms and Japanese purchases 
of  Japanese  firms.  Data  on  foreign  sellers  collected  by  Merrill  Lynch 
(table 4.4) confirm the paucity of  sales of  Japanese companies to foreign 
firms; these averaged about 3 per year. By  comparison, averages were 52, 
15, 14, and 6 per year for British, West German, French, and Swiss firms, 
respectively. 
Table 4.3  Number of Mergers and Acquisitions Involving Japanese Firms: 
1981,1985-1990 
Japanese Firms  Japanese Firms  Foreign Firms 
Acquire  Acquire  Acquire 
Year  Japanese Firms  Foreign Firms  Japanese Firms  Total 
1981  122 
1985  163 
1986  226 
1987  219 
1988  223 
1989  240 








6  176 
26  289 
21  45  I 
22  469 
17  555 
15  660 
18  75  1 
Source: Yamaichi Securities Co., Ltd., cited in Japan Economic Institute (1991a). 96  Robert Z. Lawrence 
Table 4.4  Foreign Sellers: Number of 'lkansactions,  by Country, 1982-1991* 
Country of  Ten-year 
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Sources: Mergstat Review 1991 ;  Merrill Lynch Business Brokerage and Valuation, Shaumberg, Ill. 
*Foreign sellers reflect nationality of ownership, not necessarily location of company. Transaction 
measures reflect announced transactions only and include acquisitions of both controlling and minor- 
ity interest in a company. 
4.4  Acquisition versus Greenfield Entry 
It was established earlier that, ceteris paribus, one would expect that in gen- 
eral the foreign demand for entry via acquisition would tend to be high. Indeed, 
this is confirmed by the data compiled by James W. Vaupel and Joan P. Curhan 
(1973) on the ways used by  affiliates of  U.S.-owned manufacturing firms to 
enter foreign markets between 1900 and 1968 (table 4.5). More specifically 
they found that, on average, direct acquisitions dominated newly formed ven- 
tures in entries into foreign markets of subsidiaries in which U.S. firms had at 
least a 5 percent stake. In countries in which acquisitions are made with rela- 
tively ease (such as Canada and the United Kingdom), only 35 percent of en- 
tries involved newly established operations. In  France and West  Germany, 
newly established ventures accounted for 39 percent and 42 percent of all new 
entries, respectively. Weighted by the number of firms entering, newly formed 
entrants accounted for 43 percent of all new entries in the sample. 
As might be expected, entry into developing counties (in which the supply 
of acquirable assets is limited) is more dependent on new ventures. The share 97  Japan’s Low Levels of Inward Investment 
of new ventures has also been high in some less developed industrialized coun- 
tries, such as Turkey (86 percent were new establishments), Portugal (81 per- 
cent), and Greece (78 percent). Furthermore, data on entry into the United 
States between 1981 and 1990 indicate, as in the earlier cases of Canada and 
the United Kingdom, a high dependence on acquisitions rather than greenfield 
operations. For these years, acquisitions accounted for 79 percent of all entries. 
While Japanese firms have tended to prefer greenfield entry and plant expan- 
sions more so than firms from other countries have, they have not been reluc- 
Table 4.5  Manufacturing  Foreign Affiliates of US-based Companies, 
190&1968* 
A. By Method of Entry into Foreign Country 
Country 
Newly  Acquired 





























































































B. By Time Period When US. Firms Entered into the Japanese Market 
Pre-1946  1946-1957  1958-1967 
Percentage of total  6.4  16.7  76.9 
Source: Vaupel and Curhan (1973), chap. 4,256. 
*Data cover foreign affiliates formed between 1900 and 1968. the study covers approximately 40 
percent of the total number of all foreign manufacturing affiliates of U.S. companies and approxi- 
mately 70 percent of the value of U.S.  manufacturing investment in foreign affiliates. Data include 
minority-interest and majority-owned affiliates. Table 4.6  Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Method of Investment by Source Country, 1989" 
(percentage) 
~~~ 
All  United  West 











































































Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1991). 
*The data include only investments for which the value of the transaction is known. Foreign direct investment is defined as ownership 
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tant to engage in acquisitions. In 1989, for example, 56 percent of  Japanese 
FDI involved acquisitions, and 11 percent involved purchases of  real estate 
(table 4.6). 
Uniquely among developed countries, entry into Japan  historically also 
involved a relatively large number of  greenfield investments. For the entire 
sample, the ratio was 64 percent. For the period 1957 to 1968, the ratio was 68 
percent. Thus, while a priori reasoning suggests that the demand for acqui- 
sitions as a mode of entry should be high in the case of Japan, ex post acquisi- 
tions appear to be unusually low. The foreign direct investment entry data 
confirm that there are obstacles on the supply side. 
The 24th Survey of  Foreign Affiliates in Japan, undertaken by MITI in 199  1, 
provides an even more overwhelming impression of the degree to which entry 
into majority-owned firms in Japan has occurred through greenfield opera- 
tions. As reported in table 4.7, only 7 percent of the firms in which foreigners 
have more than a 50 percent equity stake started through the acquisition of 
Japanese firms. Some 49 percent started with new  establishments, and the 
remainder began as joint ventures. 
The ex post data on the share of new  entry taking the form of  greenfield 
operations can be used to explore whether there is a relationship between the 
overall quantity of FDI and the mode of entry. These regressions are reported 
in table 4.8. Regression 1 shows that the level of assets in majority-controlled 
U.S. affiliates in Japan is 41 logarithmic percentage points lower than one 
would expect on the basis of  Japanese population and per capita purchasing 
power parity (GDP) gross domestic product. Despite the large standard errors 
of the equation, the coefficient on the Japanese dummy is almost insignificant. 
However, as shown in regression 2, inserting the variable GREEN in the re- 
gression confirms a negative association between greenfield operations and 
FDI that is significant at the 90 percent level. The addition of this variable has 
a large impact on the Japanese dummy variable: it is reduced by 60 logarithmic 
percentage points. As might be expected, the measure of tariff and nontariff 
barriers is not significant in explaining overall FDI (equations 4 and 5). It is, 
however, more significant in manufacturing (equations 6 and 7) and confirms 
that trade barriers can induce FDI. These regressions, which explain assets in 
majority-controlled manufacturing FDI, also suggest the importance of merg- 
ers and acquisitions for FDI. In this case, the dummy variable on Japan in 
equation 6 run without GREEN is -  103 logarithmic percentage points. How- 
ever, when GREEN is introduced into the regressions, the coefficient of the 
Japanese dummy falls to only -  16 logarithmic percentage points. The coeffi- 
cient on the greenfield variable, which is almost significantly different from 
zero, confirms the negative relationship between reliance on greenfield invest- 
ment as a mode of  entry and overall FDI. Ex post, therefore, the supply of 
acquirable assets appears to be an important factor in encouraging FDI. Con- 
versely, the lack of such supplies inhibits FDI. 100  Robert Z. Lawrence 
Table 4.7  Majority-owned  Foreign Direct Investment in Japan, by Industry 
and Method of Entry, 1991 (percentage of total number of firms) 
Creation of  Capital  Total Number 
Industry  Joint Venture  (greenfield)  (M&A activity)  that Responded 
Creation of  New Company  Participation  of Firms 
Total investment 
Manufacturing 
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Source: Ministry of International Trade and Industry (1991). The survey was sent to all business 
enterprises that had a foreign capital ratio of 50 percent or more as of 31 March 1991. The survey 
was sent to 2,463 companies. 
4.5  Keiretsu, FDI, and Mergers in Japan 
Few issues in US.-Japanese relations are more controversial than the keire- 
tsu relationships among Japanese firms. For many firms in the United States, 
keiretsu are the best example of the invisible barriers that make U.S.-Japanese 
investment and trade unfair. Japanese investors can buy any U.S. firm they 
choose, but it is almost impossible for U.S. investors to obtain control of most 
major Japanese firms because of  substantial cross-holdings of  stock held by 
keiretsu members. Similarly, Japanese exporters can readily sell their goods in 
the United States, but U.S. exporters find extraordinary barriers in Japan cre- 
ated by the close links between suppliers and assemblers and between manu- 101  Japan’s Low Levels of Inward Investment 
facturers and distributors. Some believe that these asymmetries in access make 
free trade with Japan undesirable; thus, they advocate managed trade. Others 
are calling for antitrust measures and changes in rules that will make keiretsu 
relationships more transparent and Japanese markets more open to foreign 
exporters and investors. 
In  the  recent  Structural Impediments Initiative  between  Japan  and  the 
United States, particular attention was paid to the role of keiretsu. The govern- 
ment of the United States argued that keiretsu linkages made foreign entry into 
Japan especially difficult. The Structural Impediments Initiative talks ended 
with an agreement by the government of Japan to strengthen the monitoring of 
transactions among keiretsu firms by  its Fair Trade Commission and to take 
steps to eliminate any restraints on competition that might arise from their 
business practices. The United States called for, among other things, stream- 
lined rules for mergers and acquisitions, stronger rights of  shareholders, and 
disclosure requirements against management. However, the relevance of keir- 
etsu remains hotly contested, and the Japanese defend it with two diametrically 
opposed arguments (Yoshitomi 1990). 
One argument is that keiretsu do not actually have significant economic ef- 
Table 4.8  Foreign Direct Investment in OECD Countries, 1990 (&statistics  in 
parentheses) 
Standard 
FDI  In(P0P)  In(GDP/C)  BAR  JPN  GREEN  Corr. RZ  Error 
1. In(MAJDFI)  0.84 
2. In(MAJDFI)  0.81 
3. In(MAJDF1)  0.76 
4. In(MAJDFI)  0.86 
5. In(MAJDFI)  0.82 
6. In(MAJMAN)  0.94 


















































0.70  0.94 
0.78  0.88 
0.74  0.88 
0.69  0.95 
0.65  0.90 
0.65  1.49 
0.70  1.39 
Sources: (1) U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of  Economic Analysis. 
(2) OECD main economic indicators. 
(3) Saxonhouse and Stem (1989). 
(4) Vaupet and Curhan (1973). 
Notes: Constant term not reported. Definitions (source number in parentheses): MAJDFI (1) = 
Assets of U.S. majority-owned affiliates. MAJMAN (1) = Assets of US.  majority-owned affili- 
ates in manufacturing. POP (2) =  Population in 1990. GDPK (2) = 1991 purchasing power parity 
per capita gross domestic product. BAR (3) =  Sum of tariff rates and tariff equivalents of nontariff 
barriers. JPN =  Dummy =  1 for Japan. GREEN =  Percentage of U.S. FDI entries in greenfield es- 
tablishments. 102  Robert Z. Lawrence 
fects. Foreign concerns about  keiretsu  simply reflect  “misunderstandings.” 
Keiretsu are really no different from arrangements in other countries, such as 
vertical integration, conglomerates, and close links between firms and banks. 
There is no need for new policies, because the Japanese economy is highly 
competitive. If firms actually made decisions based on keiretsu loyalties rather 
than on economic grounds, they would lose money and soon be driven from 
the market. Often cited in support of  this view is evidence gathered by  the 
Japanese Fair Trade Commission, which indicated that intragroup transactions 
account for only a small share of  total transactions by  keiretsu members, as 
well as evidence that keiretsu firms are not particularly profitable (Yoshitomi 
1990, 13). 
The other argument is that keiretsu linkages are very important-indeed 
they are the heart of Japanese success. It is no coincidence that the best firms 
in Japan are typically members of  keiretsu. Keiretsu provide members with 
benefits through sharing risk and information. Close links between assemblers 
and suppliers enhance the transfer of  technology. Keiretsu linkages are more 
efficient than vertical integration, because they permit reliable supply while 
preserving corporate flexibility. Stock cross-holding permits keiretsu managers 
to concentrate on long-term investment decisions. It frees them from pressures 
of the stock market and fears of takeovers, which have made U.S. managers 
short-sighted (Yoshitomi 1990, 12). 
Proponents of the second argument acknowledge that keiretsu create prob- 
lems for new foreign entrants, but they still defend it on efficiency grounds. 
According to their view, Japan is confronted with a painful dilemma: if it be- 
comes more open, it will be less efficient. In other words, those who want 
Japan to become more open are asking it to be less successful. 
Robert Lawrence (1991) evaluated these views by examining Japanese trade, 
using a model developed by  Peter Petri (1992). Trade by  industry was ex- 
plained on the basis of such variables as factor intensity, tariffs, transportation 
costs, and concentration. In addition, variables were used that were drawn from 
data developed by Dodwell Marketing Associates, which measured the share 
of sales accounted for by firms belonging to keiretsu, by industry. Statistically 
significant evidence that keiretsu were associated with reduced imports was 
found. The analysis of Japanese exports, however, gave mixed results. The ver- 
tical keiretsu of major producers and suppliers in a single industry had a posi- 
tive effect on exports, although it was not statistically significant. However, 
keiretsu of firms drawn from the former zaibatsu groups and those from other 
horizontal groups had no beneficial effect on exports. It was concluded that the 
results provided some support for the claim that vertical ties enhance effi- 
ciency. On the other hand, no support was found for claims that horizontal 
keiretsu improve performance, and it was therefore concluded that the effi- 
ciency benefits from cross-holdings may be exaggerated. 
This work on keiretsu can now  be expanded to explore, in a preliminary 
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foreign affiliates in Japan. The dependent variable is the share of industry sales 
in 1991 accounted for by majority-owned foreign affiliates, as indicated by the 
data collected for the twenty-fifth annual survey of  MITI. The independent 
variables are taken from the Petri model. In particular, variables have been 
used that measure concentration (Herfindahl index) and technological intensity 
(share of  scientists and engineers in sectoral employment). Foreign direct in- 
vestment is expected to be positively associated with both variables. A variable 
was added to indicate capital intensity and the share of industly sales by keir- 
etsu firms in 1987. In a second specification, that variable was separated into 
the share in sales of  firms in horizontal and in vertical keiretsu. The results, 
reported in table 4.9,  suggest that keiretsu are indeed negatively associated 
with FDI. As indicated in equation 1, the keiretsu variable is statistically sig- 
nificant and negatively signed. The coefficients on concentration and techno- 
logical intensity are both positive. When separate variables measuring vertical 
and horizontal keiretsu are introduced, they are insignificant and with negative 
coefficients. While not significantly different from each other, the coefficient 
of horizontal keiretsu is larger than that of vertical keiretsu. This suggests that 
each percentage increase in sales by horizontal keiretsu firms is associated with 
a relatively larger restraining impact than a percentage increase by  firms in 
vertical keiretsu. 
It should be stressed that the data sample is inordinately small; observations 
are available for only ten industries. In addition, one cannot be sure that the 
classification schemes used for measuring sales by industry are all consistent. 
Moreover, questions have been raised about the classification scheme used by 
Table 4.9  Sales and Mergers and Acquisitions by Industry (t-statistics in 
parentheses) 
Dependent 
Variable  CAPINT  HERF  TECH  KRETS  VERT9  HORIZ8  Corr.R2 
1. SALESMOF  0.03  0.002  0.42  -0.09  0.77 
2. SALESMOF  0.097  0.002  0.327  -0.08  -0.12  0.79 
3. JPNMERG  -15.34  -0.15  113.85  6.82  0.17 
4. JPNMERG  -28.17  -0.23  123.82  6.19  13.04  0.03 
(0.39)  (1.79)  (2.31)  (3.45) 
(1.11)  (2.24)  (1.75)  (3.29)  (3.31) 
(0.65)  (0.53)  (1.89)  (0.90) 
(0.87)  (0.71)  (1.86)  (0.75)  (1.04) 
Sources: (1) Japanese Ministry of Finance, corporate business statistical annual report; Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry. (2) Japan Economic Institute (1990). (3) Petrie (1992). (4) 
Dodwell Marketing Consultants (1986). 
Notes: Constant term not reported. Definitions (source number in parentheses): SALESMOF = 
Share of  foreign affiliates in  industry sales, FY1991. JPNMERG (2) = Value of  mergers and 
acquisitions, by  industry, 1984-88.  CAPINT (3) = Capital intensity. HERF (3) = Herfindahl in- 
dex. TECH (3) = Technology intensity. KRETS (4) = percentage sales by  all keiretsu. VERT9 
(4) =  Percentage sales by vertical keiretsu. HORIZ8 (4) =  Percentage sales by horizontal keiretsu. 104  Robert Z. Lawrence 
Dodwell. Nonetheless, there is no reason to believe that the data are particu- 
larly biased toward finding significantly negative relationships between keir- 
etsu and foreign sales by industry. 
To be sure, it is quite possible that keiretsu and low FDI are both correlated 
with an omitted variable that has a causal link with both. However, this variable 
must operate separately from the effects of both capital intensity and concen- 
tration, which were controlled for in the regressions. One argument worth con- 
sidering, for example, is that keiretsu enjoy a lower cost of capital, have lower 
hurdle rates of return and can therefore outbid foreigners interested in acquir- 
ing Japanese companies. It may also be the case that, if exports and FDI are 
complements, the difficulties experienced by foreign firms in entering indus- 
tries in which keiretsu predominate help to explain the finding in Lawrence 
(1991) that keiretsu have a negative impact on imports. 
Finally, the data have also been used to explore whether the existence of 
keiretsu constitutes a barrier to domestic mergers and acquisitions. Indeed, 
while keiretsu may inhibit mergers outside the group, they may actually help 
to promote such activities between members. Data on mergers and acquisitions 
(most of which were relatively small) reported to the Japan Free Trade Com- 
mission for nine industries over the period 1988 and 1989, showed that merger 
and acquisition activity is more prevalent in technology-intensive industries 
(table 4.9, equations 3 and 4). However, no effects associated with the keiretsu 
variables could be found. Apparently, keiretsu do not inhibit domestic merger 
and acquisition activity. Indeed, the coefficients of  the keiretsu variables are 
positive (although not statistically significant). The effects of keiretsu appear 
to operate on FDI but not on domestic merger and acquisition activity. 
4.6  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
During the 1980s, inward FDI in Japan grew primarily through the rein- 
vested earnings of existing firms. In fact, foreign withdrawals, particularly of 
minority-interest positions, have outweighed new equity capital investments. 
Apparently, the high values on the Tokyo stock market during the late 1980s 
not only discouraged new entrants but also encouraged existing foreign partici- 
pants to liquidate some of their positions. 
Several features of foreign activity in Japan support the anecdotal accounts 
of barriers to foreign entry and operation. These include the high share of U.S. 
receipts from Japan that take the form of license payments from unaffiliated 
Japanese firms, the high share of FDI accounted for by joint ventures, and the 
high share of majority-owned FDI in wholesale trade. Given these entry barri- 
ers, one would expect the ex ante demand for acquisitions as a mode of enter- 
ing Japan to be relatively high. 
Mergers and acquisitions in Japan, even under friendly conditions, are diffi- 
cult. Acquisitions involving foreign firms andor hostile takeovers are rare. In 
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through acquisitions. However, a disproportionate share of entries in Japan in- 
volves joint ventures and greenfield versus acquisition) and the level of FDI 
internationally helps to explain the low levels of FDI in Japan. 
The expansion of stock cross-holdings among keiretsu members and other 
Japanese firms during the 1970s was an explicit device to prevent foreigners 
from buying Japanese companies. It appears to have worked. The presence of 
keiretsu, whether horizontal or vertical, is associated with particularly low lev- 
els of  FDI. Market entry could be hindered by  practices that are explicitly 
collusive (situations in which long-term relationships are the norm), by  diffi- 
culties associated with making acquisitions of  keiretsu-related firms because 
of stock cross-holdings, or by  inherent cost-of-capital advantages enjoyed by 
keiretsu  members. Additional research is needed to  determine the precise 
mechanism that brings about this negative association. While one cannot be 
clear on precisely which mechanism is at work, the results represent additional 
evidence refuting the claim that keiretsu linkages are economically insignifi- 
cant. Although keiretsu do not appear to discourage domestic merger and 
acquisition activity, they are associated with less FDI. 
Is the environment for FDI in Japan changing? The 1992 recession in Japan, 
combined with significant declines in stock and land prices, could herald a 
change in the environment for merger and acquisition activity in Japan in gen- 
eral and for acquisitions of Japanese firms by foreign companies in particular. 
Foreigners are likely to find deals more attractive as prices fall. The Economist 
(“Biter  Bitten”  1992) noted that  though  present economic conditions will 
require considerable restructuring through mergers, most deals are likely to 
occur between firms within the same keiretsu. However, 
Japanese banks are increasingly unwilling to play their traditional role of 
arranging marriages with healthier Japanese companies. Many just want to 
get their money back as soon as possible, even if  that means selling to a 
foreign company. [Nonetheless], there is still a huge cultural divide that de- 
ters many outsiders from acquisitions in Japan. (p. 85) 
The major differences in the ease with which foreigners can acquire domestic 
companies in Japan and in other developed economies are likely to persist for 
the time being. 
As the world economy becomes increasingly integrated, institutional differ- 
ences, such as those that exist between Japan and other countries, are coming 
under particular scrutiny. One view holds that pluralism and diversity are bene- 
ficial to the global economy and that, as long as border barriers are removed, 
a high degree of national sovereignty is warranted. Certainly, since no global 
investment code exists, Japanese practices do not represent a violation of its 
international legal obligations. On the other hand, there is a growing recogni- 
tion that globalization requires mechanisms for deeper integration than that 
achieved by  the removal of  border barriers and the adherence to the formal 
legal obligations of national treatment. At certain times, as the preparation for 106  Robert Z. Lawrence 
the single European market has made clear, this may require harmonization; at 
other times, mutual recognition may  suffice. Regardless, efforts to negotiate 
measures to reconcile institutional differences are likely to continue. 
A cost-benefit analysis of these institutional practices is beyond the scope 
of this article. Foreign direct investment will generally confer benefits on both 
the host and home countries. The relatively closed Japanese market for corpo- 
rate control reduces foreign profits. It also reduces domestic competition and 
may reduce technology transfer to Japan. However, restrictions on FDI could 
also increase Japanese welfare (and reduce foreign welfare) if  it shifts rents 
from foreign to Japanese-owned firms by forcing foreign firms to license their 
products rather than to enter the Japanese market directly. 
Increasingly, firms recognize that effective global strategies require a major 
presence in each region of the triad (UN Center on Transnational Corporations 
1991). Since access to Japan is more difficult than access to the United States 
or Europe, Japanese firms could gain a strategic advantage. Indeed, in the long 
run, firms headquartered in Japan could become more competitive than those 
headquartered in the European Community or in the United States. As Japa- 
nese companies become more important rivals and as they avail themselves of 
the opportunities to invest in other nations, these asymmetries in market access 
between Japan and other countries are likely to become an increasing source 
of  friction. It is unclear whether the asymmetries will be closed by a Japanese 
movement toward foreign practices or by restraints that seek to give Japanese 
firms investing abroad access that is equivalent to that granted foreign firms in 
Japan. It is hard, however, to imagine that the current asymmetries will be 
maintained. 
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Comment  Richard C. Marston 
In his essay, Robert Lawrence provides an interesting and provocative look at 
foreign direct investment in Japan. He argues that, because of  informal and 108  Robert Z. Lawrence 
formal barriers, all forms of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Japan are much 
lower than in other comparable countries. When FDI occurs, moreover, it typi- 
cally takes the form of joint ventures or greenfield investments rather than the 
acquisition of existing firms, because foreign corporations are discouraged by 
Japanese practices from acquiring majority control of Japanese firms. 
Lawrence marshalls a variety of evidence to support these two propositions. 
The evidence on the first point is strong. Graham and Krugman (1991) show 
that the share of foreign-owned firms in total sales is 1 percent in Japan, but 
10 percent in the United States and 18 percent or higher in Britain, France, and 
Germany. The Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) balance-of-payments  data indicate that in 
1989 the stock of inward FDI is only $9.2 billion in Japan, in contrast to $400 
billion in the United States and $100 billion in Canada. U.S. data on direct 
investment in Japan, which unlike the BOJ data take into account reinvested 
earnings, show that FDI in Japan in 1989 was $21 billion, still a remarkably 
low figure. 
Lawrence also presents interesting evidence on the importance of licensing 
as an alternative to FDI. In 1990, 33 percent of U.S. receipts of direct invest- 
ment income and royalties from Japan were in the form of royalties and fees 
from licensing. In contrast, only 5.2 percent of U.S. receipts worldwide were 
in the form of royalties and fees. So a disproportionate amount of U.S. activity 
in Japan is in the form of licensing rather than direct investment. This evidence 
is consistent with the view that the Japanese market is difficult to penetrate 
(for example, because the distribution system is complex), although it does not 
indicate necessarily that Japanese companies deliberately excluded foreigners. 
One piece of evidence is difficult to reconcile with the rest. Table 4.8 exam- 
ines FDI in countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). In an equation explaining FDI as a function of 
variables such as population and GDP per capita, a dummy variable represent- 
ing Japan has no significant effect on FDI (at conventional levels of  signifi- 
cance). That’s a little surprising, given the other evidence showing that Japan 
is an outlier. 
Lawrence’s second proposition is more provocative: that the Japanese sys- 
tem blocks acquisitions by foreign firms. Much of FDI, when undertaken, takes 
the form of joint ventures or greenfield investments, not acquisitions of major- 
ity ownership in Japanese firms. According to Lawrence, FDI does not take 
the form of acquisitions because the Japanese system actively discourages ac- 
quisitions by keeping shares in friendly hands (with stable shareholdings by 
insurance companies and pension funds and with cross-holding of  shares by 
other corporations). In  industries dominated by  keiretsu, any attempt to buy 
into the industry will induce defensive reactions in which firms within the 
keiretsu buy the shares of the targeted company. Ministry of Finance rules fur- 
ther thwart potential acquirers by requiring that takeover bids by foreigners be 
delayed by ten days-time  enough to mount a rescue effort. Domestic firms 
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I will review the evidence Lawrence provides to support his view that for- 
eign acquisitions are restricted in Japan. Then I will offer an alternative expla- 
nation for the same phenomena. 
What evidence can be marshalled about foreign acquisitions? Table 4.7 pre- 
sents the results of a MITI survey of foreign-owned firms completed in 1991. 
This survey shows that only 7.1 percent of these firms were the result of acqui- 
sition. In contrast, 49.3 percent were established through greenfield invest- 
ments, while 43.7 percent were joint ventures between foreign and Japanese 
firms. So it is true that foreign acquisitions constitute a remarkably low per- 
centage of  FDI in Japan. Table 4.2, however, shows that overall merger and 
acquisition activity, by  Japanese as well as foreign firms, is much smaller in 
value in Japan than in the United States (one-sixth as large). So it may truly be 
difficult for any firm, Japanese or foreign, to acquire a Japanese firm. Table 
4.3, on the other hand, shows that in the last half of the 1980s there was a large 
surge in acquisition activity by  Japanese firms acquiring both Japanese and 
foreign firms. Japanese acquisition of other Japanese firms almost doubles be- 
tween 1985 and 1990. And Japanese acquisitions of  foreign firms increases 
fourfold during this same period. Yet  there is no increase in foreign firms’ 
acquisitions of Japanese firms. 
Let me suggest an explanation of these facts that does not rely on a conspir- 
acy theory involving Japanese firms systematically shutting out foreign acqui- 
sitions. The boom in FDI across the world occurred in the last half of  the 
1980s. That was also a period of unparalleled increases in real estate values 
and stock market values in Japan-increases  which exceeded those in other 
countries by a considerable amount. Is it possible that Japanese firms were able 
to outbid foreign firms in acquisitions of Japanese firms during this period? 
In a perfectly functioning capital market, of  course, all firms should bid 
the same amount for any given anticipated cash flow. But if  firms are capital 
constrained, then firms with large real estate holdings in Japan and cross- 
holdings of Japanese equity will be able to outbid other firms-including  those 
firms from abroad who are not sharing in the Japanese boom. This is a variation 
on Froot and Stein’s (1991) analysis in which FDI in the United States was 
driven by  the rise in foreign currencies relative to the dollar. Here it is the 
Japanese real estate and stock markets that raise the wealth of Japanese firms. 
In studying FDI in Japan, it is well to keep in mind that we are examining a 
country that liberalized FDI only in  1980. We really want to know how the 
liberalized regime of the 1980s works, not the MITI-dominated regime of the 
1960s and 1970s. The Japanese real estate and stock market booms of the last 
half of the decade may well be enough to explain why the stock of  foreign 
acquisitions was so low at the end of the decade. By this reasoning, the recent 
collapse of the Nikkei should lead to more acquisitions by  foreign firms and 
thus a reversal of present patterns. 
Having introduced an alternative explanation for the low level of foreign 
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Lawrence’s explanation. Table 4.9 presents equations explaining the share of 
1991 industry sales in Japan that is accounted for by majority-owned foreign 
affiliates. Lawrence explains the share with conventional variables such as con- 
centration ratios and technological intensity. But he also adds a variable repre- 
senting the share of  sales by  keiretsu in that industry. He finds statistically 
significant effects of these sales. That is, FDI sales are significantly lower in 
industries where keiretsu are important. This is important evidence. 
There are some possible explanations for this finding which do not rely on 
conspiracy theories. It could be, for example, that keiretsu are concentrated in 
industries where foreign investment is undesirable for reasons unrelated to the 
keiretsu per se. (Lawrence mentions the possibility that some omitted factor 
explains these results). Or suppose that we take the statistical results at face 
value. It could be that industries where keiretsu dominate are less attractive 
targets for direct investment because acquisition might jeopardize beneficial 
ties among firms within the keiretsu. If  so, then the existence of the keiretsu 
discourages acquisitions but  not  necessarily because firms in  the  keiretsu 
mount defensive operations to keep shares out of foreign hands. In any case, 
the statistical evidence buttresses Lawrence’s case that it is Japanese behavior, 
whether intentionally designed to exclude foreigners or not, that discourages 
acquisitions. 
Overall, Lawrence’s paper provides a convincing case that FDI in Japan is 
different than elsewhere. Whether this is due to deliberate exclusionary prac- 
tices or to other causes is still subject to debate. 
References 
Froot, Kenneth A., and Jeremy C. Stein. 1991. Exchange rates and foreign direct invest- 
ment: An imperfect capital markets approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics  106 
(November): 1191-217. 
Graham, Edward M., and Paul R. Krugman.  1991. Foreign direct  investment in the 
United States. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics. 
Discussion Summary 
Kenneth Froot began the discussion by suggesting that differences in language 
and culture, rather than actual discrimination, may explain why there is so little 
FDI into Japan; geographic isolation may be a further explanation. Also, the 
keiretsu groups can marshal1 liquidity to defend against a hostile takeover of 
any member by an outsider. 
Martin Feldstein observed that the high Japanese share prices have been a 
barrier to foreign acquisitions in recent years. Foreigners could not get the 
same price-earnings ratios and therefore could not justify the acquisition of a 111  Japan’s Low Levels of Inward Investment 
Japanese firm. He suggested that a majority-owned wholesale trade company 
is likely to be just  a marketing subsidiary of  a U.S. manufacturer, and he 
pointed out that direct investment is fundamentally different from licensing. 
The latter is essentially static; the licensee obtains what is known at a point in 
time but does not  share in the dynamic of  change and does not get future 
products. 
Raymond Vernon began his comments with a general statistical point about 
cross-country data sets. Because there is no “universe” of  which the current 
observations are a sample, there is no meaning to the standard errors. It is 
appropriate therefore to look at the coefficients as descriptive material but to 
ignore the t-statistics. Since there are many individual cases of barriers to for- 
eign investment that are known, the statistical estimates confirm the existence 
of these barriers. Any other finding would not have been believable. Also, there 
is a data problem associated with licensing fees for intrafirm transactions. 
James Hines suggested expanding the sample beyond the OECD. He noted 
that Japanese tax rules would discourage foreign investment in Japan. 
Deborah Swenson mentioned that acquisitions are frequently spin-offs that 
are not doing well, but there are not many of these in Japan. Robert Lawrence 
noted in response that this is not true in Japan, where the keiretsu takes over 
sick spin-offs. 
Michael Adler asked what the welfare consequences are of FDI. Lawrence 
named three in response: japanese welfare is reduced by  a reduction in FDI, 
rent shifting may benefit Japan, and asymmetry of bilateral pattern of FDI cre- 
ates tension. 
Karl Sauvant pointed out that if global production is key to a firm’s ability 
to compete, closing a market to foreign firms hurts their ability to compete 
worldwide. 
Peter Petri offered a further explanation of why U.S. firms do not invest in 
Japan: that U.S. firms may not have a comparative advantage in manufacturing. 
Japanese firms come to the United States because they have such a comparative 
advantage. Richard Caves added that there are a variety of other factors that 
may explain why there is so little FDI in Japan: distance, language, and so on. 
Said Geopey  Curlinel; “There was a time when General Motors could have 
bought  Toyota  for  less  than  it  spent  on  direct  investment  in  plant  and 
equipment.” 
Robert Feenstra ended the discussion by commenting that keiretsu firms are 
a market for other members of the group. A foreign investor would not have 
this advantage. This also serves as a barrier. This Page Intentionally Left Blank